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Emerging market firms (EMFs) are increasingly recognized as a heterogeneous group
of business enterprises, providing a unique context for examining the predictive power
of existing theories. Drawing on real options and internalization theories, this paper pre-
dicts the contrasting effect of bilateral relationships on EMFs’ ownership choice in cross-
border acquisitions. The conflicting conjectures are tested using data consisting of almost
1,000 cross-border acquisition deals. Our results show that weak economic, political and
military relationships between acquiring and target countries induce EMFs to opt for full
acquisitions. The findings support the view of internalization theory, highlighting that
EMFs prefer full ownership over partial ownership by coping with the political risk de-
rived from weak bilateral relationships.
Introduction
Recent studies suggest that consideration of bi-
lateral relationships between nations is crucial for
the success of cross-border acquisitions (Bertrand,
Betschinger and Settles, 2016; Hasija, Liou and
Ellstrand, 2019; Li et al., 2019). Unfavourable or
weak bilateral relationships between acquirer and
target country provide challenges in cross-border
acquisitions, especially for emerging market firms
(EMFs) as acquirers. As cross-border acquisition
helps EMFs to rapidly catch up with their com-
petitors in target countries by securing critical re-
sources, acquiring advanced technology and man-
agerial expertise (Chari and Chang, 2009; Kohli
andMann, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007), it often in-
vokes fear and anxiety amongst the local popula-
tion and creates institutional barriers in host coun-
tries (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2011; Kim, 2007;
Riad andVaara, 2011; Shenkar, Luo andYeheskel,
2008).
For example, Chinese firms faced harsh re-
actions on their ownership decision from Aus-
tralia’s Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)
in 2009. The Foreign Acquisitions & Takeovers
Act (FATA) states that individual foreign buyers
need approval to acquire more than 15% of an
Australian company – or 40% if there is more than
one buyer – and the application to acquire a com-
pany may be refused if it is deemed to be against
the national interest (Economist Intelligence Unit,
2010). This evidence shows that bilateral relation-
ships entail a great deal of complexity (e.g. anti-
trust laws, merger and acquisition (M&A) regula-
tions) for EMFs’ ownership choice in cross-border
acquisitions (Duanmu, 2014; Li and Vashchilko,
2010; Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011).
Despite the relevance of bilateral relationships
to EMFs’ ownership choice in cross-border acqui-
sitions, this has received relatively little attention
(Li and Vashchilko, 2010, p. 765). Prior studies
examine the effects of firm, deal and country-
specific factors on the ownership choice of ac-
quiring firms (Contractor et al., 2014; Malhotra
and Gaur, 2014; Malhotra, Lin and Farrell, 2016).
Among the country-level factors, most research
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focuses on the influence of cultural, geographic
and institutional distances between a home and
a host country rather than addressing the special
(bilateral) relationship between a home and a
host country as a potential driver of ownership
decisions in cross-border acquisitions. While the
role of distance or difference between countries in
international business may have diminished with
advancements in telecommunication and trans-
portation (Friedman, 2007), bilateral relationships
are recognized as powerful and attractive forces
to achieve economic aims in an increasingly glob-
alized world (Balabanis et al., 2001; Ramamurti,
2001).
Seeking to address these issues, the purpose of
this paper is to theorize and examine the effect of
bilateral relationships between acquirer and tar-
get nations on the ownership choices of EMFs as
acquirers in cross-border acquisitions. It adopts
a parsimonious approach, contrasting real option
theory, which predicts that weak bilateral relations
will result in partial acquisitions or a lower equity
share in target firms by EMFs with internalization
theory, which predicts that EMFs will choose full
acquisitions or seek a higher equity share in tar-
get firms when bilateral relationships between ac-
quiring and target countries are weak. The empiri-
cal data on cross-border acquisitions during 2000–
2013 by EMFs from Brazil, China, India, Mexico
and Russia is analysed. Our analysis to explain the
ownership choice of EMFs supports the view of
internalization theory.
Our contributions are twofold. First, combining
insights from real options and internalization the-
ory, it advances our understanding of how affinity
(or animosity) between countries, reflected in their
economic, political and military affairs, influences
EMFs’ ownership choice in cross-border acquisi-
tions (Balabanis et al., 2001; Ramamurti, 2001).
This complements prior work that has primarily
considered Western multinational firms’ tendency
towards balancing the need for control and the
need to contain the cost of ownership (Malhotra,
Lin and Farrell, 2016; Xu and Shenkar, 2002).
Our analysis of EMFs shows that they have an
overwhelming concern for control and much less
sensitivity to issues of ownership cost. This find-
ing reminds us that economic rationales based
on Western experience may not be universally
applicable, emphasizing the need to examine the
predictive power of existing theories in a new
context (Peng, 2003).
Second, we contribute more broadly to an
emerging body of international business litera-
ture drawing on the perspective of international
relations scholarship and political risk (Arikan,
Arikan and Shenkar, 2020; Duanmu, 2014; Gao,
Wang and Che, 2018; Li and Vashchilko, 2010;
Makino and Tsang, 2011) that emphasizes the
need to extend the country-dyadic lens from dis-
tance to friction (Shenkar, Luo and Yeheskel,
2008). While many studies have shown that dis-
tance or difference leads to discordance in cross-
border acquisition, affecting its completion and
value creation, unfavourable or weak bilateral re-
lationship as a source of discordance was over-
looked (Li et al., 2019). We show that weak bi-
lateral political, economic and military relation-
ships between acquiring and target countries entail
a higher political risk for foreign acquiring firms
(Doh, Teegen and Mudambi, 2004), thereby af-
fecting their ownership strategies. In this sense, we
contribute to a growing body of research (Arikan
and Shenkar, 2013; Bertrand, Betschinger and Set-
tles, 2016; Gao, Wang and Che, 2018; Hasija, Liou
and Ellstrand, 2019; Li and Vashchilko, 2010; Li
et al., 2018; Peillex, Yoon andRouine, 2019; Zhang
and He, 2014) that has begun to capture a dyadic
view of institutional factors in the context of cross-
border acquisitions.
Literature review
The international business literature examining
the role of institutional factors has focused
on location-specific immobile attributes that are
found independently in certain countries (Makino
and Tsang, 2011). Accordingly, prior studies
mainly consider the distance and difference (cul-
tural, geographic, language, legal, political, regula-
tory) between countries (Buckley et al., 2016, 2017;
Cuypers, Ertug and Hennart, 2015; Ellis et al.,
2018; Morosini, Shane and Singh, 1998; Wu and
Salomon, 2017). The basic premise is that the var-
ious kinds of distance between countries make in-
ternational exchange and transactions difficult and
costly (Makino and Tsang, 2011).
Despite the contributions made by the prior
studies, the role of distance or difference between
countries in contemporary international business
may be less relevant than the strength of ties.
This is mainly because distance or difference be-
tween countries does not capture the strength of
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bilateral relationships that have become a power-
ful tool in doing international business in an in-
creasingly polarized world (Binnendijk, 2016). In
fact, even though the cultural and geographic dis-
tance between China and Japan is lower than that
between China and the UK, Chinese firms may
prefer or be more welcomed1 to invest in the UK
than in Japan due to the favourable and friendly bi-
lateral relationships (meaning less conflicts in eco-
nomic, political and military agenda) formed be-
tween China and the UK.
This prompts the need to examine the role
of bilateral relationships that have evolved over
time between countries (Balabanis et al., 2001;
Ramamurti, 2001). In response to this, we use
time-variant measures of bilateral relationships
to explain EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions. In
this sense, the approach used in our current
study extends the country-dyadic lens of exist-
ing institutional-level determinants from (static)
distance to (time-variant) relationships between
home and host countries (Shenkar, Luo and
Yeheskel, 2008).
Recently, although there have been a small but
growing number of studies that address the role
of bilateral relationships in international alliance
formation (Arikan and Shenkar, 2013), foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) location choice and per-
formance (Gao, Wang and Che, 2018; Li et al.,
2018), acquisition deal completion (Zhang andHe,
2014; Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers, 2011) and FDI
flows (Li and Vashchilko, 2010), we need to pay
closer attention to at least two issues in the inter-
nationalization of EMFs. First, since EMFs are
known to focus on securing critical resources or
strategic assets mainly through acquisitions (An-
derson, Sutherland and Severe, 2015; Luo and
Tung, 2007; McCarthy and Aalbers, 2016), under-
standing their ownership decisions (full vs. partial)
in cross-border acquisitions is important. In fact,
there is often no other way to secure the resources
than through acquisitions, because such critical re-
sources are not available as free-standing assets on
the open market.
Second, it is known that bilateral relationships
influence nation-states to reduce conflict and
improve cooperation, as they bring fewer disagree-
1For example, whereas the Japanese government banned
China’s Huawei and ZTE from official contracts, the
British government decided to letHuawei build its 5Gnet-
work (New York Times, 2020).
ments and pose less of a threat to each other’s
interests. Despite their significance, there are only
a few studies investigating the role of bilateral
relationships in the internationalization of EMFs.
Prior studies (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010;
Zhang and He, 2014; Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers,
2011) have highlighted the fact that EMFs’ acqui-
sitions encounter economic nationalism in host
countries derived from weak bilateral relation-
ships. Under these circumstance, cross-border ac-
quisitions led by EMFs are not always preferred or
viewed as favourable by stakeholders in host coun-
tries, thereby triggering host-country government
interference2 (Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 2011).
To address the above issues, we craft our hy-
potheses to explain the effect of bilateral relation-
ships on EMFs’ ownership choice in cross-border
acquisitions.
Theoretical foundation and hypothesis
development
We build our two contrasting predictions by draw-
ing on real options and internalization theories to
explain the choice of ownership by EMFs in the
context of cross-border acquisitions. Our analy-
sis draws on these two theories to formulate con-
trasting hypotheses, as the contextual conditions
for utilizing both theories is met in the case of ac-
quisitions which have a firm versus market and a
timing dimension.
Real options theory mainly addresses two types
of options (Buckley, Casson and Gulamhussen,
2004, p. 57). First, non-contractual options allow
firms to vary the size, location, timing and uti-
lization of an investment project once the initial
phase is complete. Second, contractual options al-
low firms to acquire or divest assets owned or
partly controlled by other firms. The inclusion of
these two types of options – non-contractual (es-
pecially location issues) and contractual (owner-
ship) options – advanced the modern economic
theory of international business. Our study fo-
cuses on contractual options in cross-border ac-
quisitions. From a real option perspective, partial
2Although government interference can take explicit (e.g.
de jure) or implicit (e.g. de facto) forms, it is known that
many countries rarely have de jure power to block any ac-
quisitions based on the acquirer’s nationality (Dinc and
Erel, 2013).
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ownership or acquisitions3 gives EMFs the flexi-
bility to cope with political risks by making their
investment in target firms more easily reversible
(e.g. selling a minority stake is easier than selling
the whole firm) and more easily extendable (e.g. by
increasing the ownership share) (Chi et al., 2019).
Whereas real option theory is more bounded in
its applicability, as it is focused upon the ability to
defer decisions, and thus to attain flexibility with
the possibility of acquiring more information and
avoiding mistakes (Buckley and Casson, 2010), in-
ternalization theory addressing full ownership is a
general theory focusing on the conditions under
which organization of activities within a firm is su-
perior to market transactions (contracts) (Buckley
and Casson, 1976). Internalization theory empha-
sizes that cross-border acquisitions provide learn-
ing opportunities for acquiring firms to appropri-
ate the rent generated by internalizing activities
with high up-front investment via full ownership
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). Overall, cross-border
acquisitions fall within the normal boundary con-
ditions of both theories.
By using these two theoretical lenses, we are able
to probe deeper into the effect of bilateral rela-
tionships4 on EMFs’ ownership choice. The basic
assumption is that acquisitions by EMFs origi-
nating from countries with strong or favourable
bilateral relationships are less likely to be perceived
as a threat and cause unfavourable interferences by
the host country (Ellis et al., 2018). In other words,
host-country government agents are less likely to
be concerned about cross-border acquisitions if
economic transactions involve foreign firms from
countries with similar national interests (Hasija,
Liou and Ellstrand, 2019). However, acquiring
firms – especially originating from a country with
an unfavourable bilateral relationship – can be
viewed as conquerors that carry a threatening
aura of dominance (Salk and Shenkar, 2001).
Subsequently, a weak or unfavourable bilateral
relationship implies higher transaction costs and
3While selling a full stake is more flexible (ease of
decision-making), the net loss is likely to be lower for
partial ownership than for full ownership if the acquirer
must exit (Malhotra and Gaur, 2014). Thus, firms’ partial
ownership decision is consistent with real options theory.
4We focus on the bilateral relationships formed around
economic, political and military arenas and between
home and host countries (Buckley et al., 2017; Oneal and
Russett, 1997).
information asymmetries for acquiring firms, rais-
ing the additional cost of doing business in the
host market (Meyer, 2001).
Collectively, weak or unfavourable bilateral re-
lationships increase the likelihood of host-country
government interference, because the host coun-
try considers the transaction to pose a relatively
higher threat to its economic well-being and other
national interests (Bertrand, Betschinger and Set-
tles, 2016; Eden and Miller, 2004). Accordingly,
the overarching reasoning in our predictions relies
on political risk, which is conceived of host gov-
ernment interference (Kobrin, 1979). Specifically,
we adopt Simon’s (1984) framework, which cate-
gorizes political risk according to the flow of risk
including direct-internal, direct-external, indirect-
internal and indirect-external. Since our analysis
focuses on changes in relations between the host
and home countries, we focus on indirect-external
political risks, which we operationalize as bilateral
relationships. Given the political risk derived from
the bilateral relationships, EMFs can either opt for
a lower equity position by balancing the need for
control and cost from a real options perspective, or
fully acquire the target firm by having more con-
cerns over control than cost from an internaliza-
tion view.
First, according to real options theory, higher
investment risk increases the value of adopting
lower equity investments while waiting for the res-
olution of potential risks (McDonald and Siegel,
1986; Rivoli and Salorio, 1996). Although the
real options reasoning has thus far been advanced
to explain foreign market entry through joint
ventures (Kogut, 1991), as in the case of entry
into emerging technology markets (Folta, 1998),
a growing number of studies (Ahammad et al.,
2017; Chari and Chang, 2009; Cuypers and Mar-
tin, 2010; Malhotra and Gaur, 2014) argue and
show that entry through the cross-border acquisi-
tion of partial equity in target firms can also serve
the same purpose of economizing on the cost of
resource commitment. This flexible approach of
partial acquisitions gives managers the capability
to respond to unknown waters (Ahammad et al.,
2017; Wooster, Blanco and Sawyer, 2016).
In the context of EMFs’ cross-border acquisi-
tions, a weak bilateral relationship entails higher
political risk and information asymmetry for
EMFs that may limit their access to information
about target firms, about the industry in which
those targets operate and about the host country
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(Shimizu et al., 2004). The costs of acquiring
credible, reliable information in foreign countries
also increase with greater information asymmetry
derived from a weak bilateral relationship (Portes
andRey, 2005). In a similar vein, Ragozzino (2009)
found that investors choose to acquire a larger
stake in a target based in a neighbouring market
than in a more remote market. Thus, by opting
for a lower equity position in the target firm,
EMFs can overcome the challenges associated
with information asymmetry derived from weak
bilateral relationships (Chi et al., 2019; Malhotra
and Gaur, 2014).
In addition, when the bilateral relationship is
weak, EMFs may be exposed to moral hazards by
target firms. In order to cope with the issue, ac-
quirers can create a hostage effect by opting for
partial or lower equity ownership. Acceptance of
partial ownership by target firms signals their con-
fidence in the future prospects of their firm, which
reduces the acquirer’s risk of ex-post moral haz-
ards (Chen and Hennart, 2004). As the partner
from a target country has a stake in the merged
entity, it also has an incentive to ensure that the
new entity succeeds by restraining its opportunis-
tic behaviour. Furthermore, when the bilateral re-
lationship between acquirer and target countries
is weak, the potential negative attitudes accom-
panying acquisitions become aggravated, as tar-
gets view the acquisition as posing a danger to
their national identity and pride (Riad and Vaara,
2011; Shenkar, Luo and Yeheskel, 2008). Subse-
quently, it can lead to host-country government in-
terference and pronounced resistance by the target
firms, and in turn will induce acquiring firms to be
hesitant to have full control over the target firms
(Bertrand, Betschinger and Settles, 2016; Malho-
tra and Gaur, 2014). Thus, partial ownership will
be favoured by EMFs, which helps them test un-
known waters, because they are concerned with
the costs of making choices on deploying fewer re-
sources due to the increase in political risk.
In light of all these arguments, from the perspec-
tive of real options theory, we posit:
H1a: EMFs will choose partial acquisitions or
seek a lower share of equity in target firms
when the bilateral relationships between acquir-
ing and target countries are weak.
While our expectation on real options theory
would highlight the risk derived from weak bi-
lateral relationships that limits acquiring firms’
commitment (Beugelsdijk, Ambos and Nell, 2018;
Nell, Kappen and Laamanen, 2017), internaliza-
tion theory emphasizes that doing business in
a country with weak bilateral relationships can
provide learning opportunities (Stahl and Tung,
2015). Such an internalization advantage applies
to firms that fully exploit their ownership advan-
tage internally, thereby minimizing the transaction
costs associated with the inter-firm transfer of pro-
prietary knowledge and capabilities (Buckley and
Casson, 2020; Buckley and Hashai, 2009). De-
spite the high level of political risk associated with
cross-border acquisitions, foreign firms can com-
mit a significant amount of up-front resource in-
vestment and transfer costs to internalize business
activities and control risks (Buckley and Hashai,
2005; Contractor et al., 2014; Hashai, 2009; Mal-
hotra and Gaur, 2014; Malhotra, Lin and Far-
rell, 2016). By committing financial resources to
the target firms, acquiring firms benefit from a
variety of synergies, albeit together with the in-
creased transaction costs deriving from full own-
ership (Ahammad et al., 2018).
In the context of EMFs’ cross-border acquisi-
tions, weak bilateral relationships can induce pro-
nounced resistance by the target firms (Bertrand,
Betschinger and Settles, 2016). As weak bilateral
relationships increase the likelihood of govern-
ment intervention in favour of the domestic target
firm, the bargaining power of the domestic target
firm can be strengthened, triggering target firms’
opportunistic behaviour (Dinc and Erel, 2013;
Enderwick, 2011). In other words, partial owner-
ship in the context of weak bilateral relationships
can overlook partner-related opportunism and
create more tensions between acquiring and target
firms, making negotiation and integration pro-
cesses difficult (Chari and Chang, 2009). However,
with greater levels of ownership and hierarchical
control, EMFs can reduce opportunism on the
part of target firm managers (Williamson, 1985)
or facilitate the transfer of uncodifiable assets
(Kogut, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Although
full acquisitions entail higher investments in hu-
man, physical and intangible assets, and greater
overall commitment (e.g. acquisition premium),
especially when the bilateral relationship is weak
(Ahammad et al., 2017; Bertrand, Betschinger and
Settles, 2016), EMFs may prefer full ownership
to reduce tensions with business partners and as
a way of circumventing problems arising from a
lack of strategic fit (Cui and Jiang, 2009). The
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greater level of control associated with full owner-
ship can make it easier to obtain cooperation from
the management and employees of the target firm
originating from hostile countries. As such, greater
internalized control allows EMFs to achieve more
efficient learning. Thus, full ownership can be
favoured by EMFs as it facilitates faster, more
efficient decision-making, reduces the chances of
conflict and boosts their learning (Malhotra and
Gaur, 2014).
In light of all these arguments, from the perspec-
tive of internalization theory, we posit:
H1b: EMFs will choose full acquisitions or seek
a higher share of equity in target firms when the
bilateral relationships between acquiring and
target countries are weak.
Methods
Data and sample
Cross-border acquisition deals led by EMFs that
occurred between 2000 and 2013 were collected
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Plat-
inumdatabase. Our empirical analyses focus on the
firms originating from five large scalable emerging
economies –Brazil, China, India,Mexico andRus-
sia – that are characterized by a high degree of in-
ternationalization (see Luo and Tung, 2007). Our
sample only includes the cross-border acquisitions
originating from these five emerging countries, as
suggested by Luo and Tung (2007), because in re-
cent decades their national economies have grown
rapidly, their industries have undergone dramatic
structural changes and their markets hold promise
despite volatile domestic institutions.
In constructing our sample, we followed the pro-
cedures of Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Ja-
yaraman (2009) and kept the acquisition deals: (1)
that are fully completed; (2) where the acquirer and
target are from different countries; and (3) where
the acquiring company is publicly traded (among
10,861 observations from our initial dataset, 331
cross-border acquisition deals were made by non-
publicly traded acquiring firms). We drop the ob-
servations if the acquiring firms were originating
from Hong Kong or Macao; or the target firms
were from tax havens such as Bermuda, the Ba-
hamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands and Puerto Rico (Chakrabarti, Gupta-
Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009; Li et al., 2018;
Yoon and Lee, 2016). The first screening pro-
cess allowed us to secure 10,530 observations. We
then used Thomson Reuters DataStream to col-
lect firm-level data. Among our 10,530 observa-
tions, only 3,199 firms had a Datastream code. Af-
ter merging all our data from multiple sources (see
Table 1) to construct variables at deal, firm and
country level, and removing missing values, our
sample consists of 1,001 cross-border acquisitions.
Moreover, in accordancewith the approach of Luo
andTung (2007) onEMFs, we exclude state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) from our sample. Thus, our fi-
nal sample consists of 997 cross-border acquisi-
tions led by the acquiring firms from Brazil, Rus-
sia, China, India and Mexico.
As shown in Table 1, the majority of cross-
border acquisitions were led by Indian firms (408
out of 997). The remainder of the transactions
were led by Russian (17.05%), Chinese (14.64%)
and Brazilian and Mexican firms (around 13%).
Regarding the target countries, 26% were in the
USA and 6% in the UK. The number of differ-
ent combinations of countries in our sample is
166. The most common country pairs are India–
USA (124 deals), Mexico–USA (53 deals), India–
UK (45 deals), China–USA (44 deals) and Brazil–
Argentina (35 deals).
Variables
Dependent variable. Following Lahiri, Elango
and Kundu (2014), we consider that if the ac-
quiring firm obtains less than 100% of the target
firm, the acquisition is partial. By contrast, the ac-
quisition is considered full if the acquiring firm
bought 100% of the target firm. Accordingly, we
constructed a dummy variable Ownership Choice
that equals 1 if the acquisition is full, and 0 if the
acquisition is partial (Lahiri, Elango and Kundu,
2014; Malhotra, Lin and Farrell, 2016). In our
sample, we observe a moderately balanced distri-
bution between the number of partial acquisitions
(433) and the number of full acquisitions (564).
Independent variables. We test the effect of the bi-
lateral relationships on ownership choice by con-
sidering economic, political and military arenas
between acquiring and target countries (Buckley
et al., 2017; Oneal and Russett, 1997). Our in-
dependent variables are universal and cover the
vast majority of nations in the global economy.
First, Economic Relations measures the degree of
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Table 1. Number of cross-border acquisitions by country







Target countries N Target countries N Target countries N
Argentina 47 Indonesia 10 Peru 18
Australia 48 Ireland-Rep 4 Philippines 3
Austria 6 Italy 24 Poland 3
Bahamas 1 Japan 11 Portugal 10
Bangladesh 1 Kazakhstan 16 Qatar 1
Belgium 13 Kenya 1 Romania 7
Bolivia 3 Laos 1 Senegal 1
Brazil 36 Latvia 2 Singapore 15
Bulgaria 5 Liberia 2 South Korea 7
Cambodia 1 Libya 1 Spain 20
Canada 39 Lithuania 1 Sri Lanka 8
Chile 13 Luxembourg 6 Sudan 1
China 7 Malaysia 4 Sweden 5
Colombia 20 Mauritius 8 Switzerland 10
Czech Republic 13 Mexico 17 Tajikistan 2
Denmark 5 Mongolia 6 Thailand 5
El Salvador 3 Mozambique 1 Turkey 8
Estonia 5 Namibia 2 Turkmenistan 2
Finland 7 Nepal 2 United Kingdom 61
France 20 Netherlands 22 United States 262
Gabon 4 New Zealand 6 Uruguay 11
Germany 34 Nicaragua 3 United Arab Emirates 10
Greece 1 Norway 4 Uzbekistan 7
Honduras 1 Oman 6 Venezuela 3
Hungary 6 Paraguay 5 Vietnam 4
India 9 Total 997
bilateral trade openness between the target and the
acquirer nation. This variable is the summation of
export and import flows between the host and the
home country divided by the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) of the target country (Chakrabarti,
Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009; Oneal
and Russet, 1997).
Economic relations between countries are
formed through international trade activities
(Buckley and Munjal, 2017). A strong economic
connection via international trade between ac-
quiring and host nations helps EMFs encounter
less resistance to deal-making in cross-border
acquisitions. This accounts for economic interde-
pendencies in the dyad that could influence the
ability of host governments to intervene. Some
studies have shown that countries with similar
national interests trade more with each other, and
vice versa (Dixon and Moon, 1993). Dixon and
Moon (1993) explain that although countries that
share similar views on global political issues are
not guaranteed to have friendly economic rela-
tions with each other, those countries are far less
likely to experience hostile economic actions (i.e.
trade protectionism) than countries characterized
by a higher divergence in opinion on economic
affairs. In our research context, a strong economic
bilateral relationship could signal to the EMFs
that it is less risky and easier to collaborate with
the host-country firm and to entrust their local
operations to the host-country counterparts.
Second, Political Relations measures the level
of political affinity between the home and the
host country, which is based on the annual vot-
ing decisions of the acquiring and the target coun-
try made in the United Nations (UN) General
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Table 2. Overview of variables
Variables Measurement
Dependent variable
Ownership Choice (Lahiri et al.,
2014; Malhotra et al., 2016)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the acquisition is full and 0 if the acquisition is partial.
Source: SDC Platinum
Independent variables
Economic Relations (Oneal and
Russet, 1997; Chakrabarti et al.,
2009)
Degree of bilateral trade openness between the target and the acquirer nation. Measured by
the summation of export and import flows between the host and the home country
divided by the GDP of the target country. Source: World Bank
Political Relations (Gartzke, 2000) Level of political affinity between the home and the host country. Estimated from the annual
voting decisions of the acquiring and the target country made in the UN General
Assembly. Source: Correlates of War project
Military Relations (Vergne, 2012;
Vergne and Depeyre, 2016)
Measured by the summation of arms export and import flows between the host and the
home country divided by the GDP of the target country. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers
Control variables
Cultural Distance (Chari and
Chang, 2009; Malhotra and
Gaur, 2014)
Distance between the host and the home country across the four cultural dimensions of
Hofstede (1980). Source: Hofstede
Institutional Distance (Gaur and
Lu, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 2009;
Malhotra and Gaur, 2014)
Difference in governance infrastructure quality between host and home country by
aggregating the national scores for control of corruption, government effectiveness,
political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability. Source:
World Bank




Dummy variable coded as 1 if the target and the acquirer nation had a colonial link and as 0
otherwise. Source: CEPII
Common Language (Buckley et al.,
2017)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the target and the acquirer country share a common official
language and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPII
Geographic Distance (Ellis et al.,
2018; Malhotra et al., 2011)
Logarithm of geographic distance between capitals of the target and acquirer nations (in
kilometres). Source: CEPII
Developed Country (Buckley et al.,
2007; Gubbi et al., 2010)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the host firm is from an OECD member country and 0
otherwise. Source: OECD
GDP Growth Target Crisis Target
(Chung et al., 2013)
GDP growth rate in the host country. Dummy variable coded as 1 if the target country
experienced four consecutive quarterly declines in GDP before the deal and 0 otherwise.
Source: World Bank
Private Target (Kedia and Bilgili,
2015; Malhotra et al., 2011)




Dummy variable coded as 1 if the target and the acquiring firm have the same three-digit
SIC code and 0 otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum
Cash Payment (Lim et al., 2016;
Malhotra et al., 2016)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if more than 50% of the deal value is paid with cash, and zero
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum
Acquirer Size (Chari and Chang,
2009; Kogut and Singh, 1988)
Logarithm of total assets of the acquirer firm. Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream
Acquirer Profitability (Bertrand
et al., 2016; Lim et al., 2016)
ROA of the acquirer firm. Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream
Acquirer Leverage (Peillex and
Ureche-Rangau, 2016)
Debt-to-equity ratio of the acquirer firm. Source: Thomson Reuters DataStream
Acquisition Experience (Malhotra
et al., 2016)
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the acquirer firm has a prior CBA in the target country and 0
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum
Assembly (Gartzke, 2000). The variable represents
the degree of closeness of votes at UNGeneral As-
semblies between states and so reveals their bilat-
eral national interests (Bertrand, Betschinger and
Settles, 2016). From an empirical perspective, po-
litical affinity approximates the similarity degree
of the bilateral national interests in year t from the
votes Vit and V
j
t of country i and country j, calcu-
lated as follows:
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where Dt is the sum of metric distance (in abso-





the largest distance between those votes. In the
UNGeneral Assembly, countries have a choice be-
tween three voting options, namely, approve an is-
sue, disapprove an issue or abstain. The variable
Political A¡nityi,jt is between −1 and +1. While the
value −1 indicates that the country dyads made
completely opposite votes in year t, the value +1
indicates that they have an identical voting pattern
in year t.
Political affinity reflects the political bilateral
relations between countries that is an underlying
driver of ‘special relationships’ between countries.
It influences the decision-making process in cross-
border acquisitions through political interference
by host-country governments. This is because the
interests of a host country are strongly affected
when foreign firms take possession of domestic
(host-country) firms and the resources embedded
in them. Once the assets of the domestic target
firm are under the control of the foreign firms, the
host country could expect its external dependence
to increase, leading to political and economic
vulnerability (Bertrand, Betschinger and Settles,
2016). In sum, when political relations (affinity)
are stronger (higher), countries pose a lower
threat to each other’s interests (Dixon and Moon,
1993; Gartzke, 2000), which reduces the potential
conflict in cross-border acquisitions (Bertrand,
Betschinger and Settles, 2016; Li et al., 2019;
Peillex, Yoon and Rouine, 2019).
Third, Military Relations is measured by arms
transfers between the host and the home country.
With the data collected from SIPRI (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute) Arms
Transfers, we measure the variable by the summa-
tion of arms export and import flows (aircraft, air
defence systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons,
armoured vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sen-
sors, satellite and ships) between the home and the
host country divided by the GDP of the target
country (Vergne, 2012; Vergne andDepeyre, 2016).
The flows are based on the known unit production
costs of weapons and thus represent the transfer of
military resources rather than the financial value
of the transfer.
From the perspective of security and the bal-
ance of power, Waltz (1979) proposed that coun-
tries will form military ties to counter other na-
tions and groups of nations seeking to achieve a
dominant position. In particular, once the arms-
importing countries become familiarized with so-
phisticated weapons, they lead to learning by do-
ing or adaptation to domestic uses (Leuenberger
and Weinstein, 2012). In other words, the higher
the arms transfer, the less the exporting countries
are concerned with the recipient countries’ appro-
priation of military weapons and technology. In
addition, the presence of strong military relations
means that there is mutual respect and trust be-
tween home and host countries. It also shows that
they have a common or similar interest in their
national security issues. Thus, an EMF is less likely
to experience hostile sanctions or actions from the
host-country regime when there is a strong mili-
tary relationship formed between home and host
country.
Control variables. To account for any idiosyn-
cratic differences, we used acquirer country, indus-
try and year dummies throughout all our models.
Moreover, we include a number of deal, firm and
country-specific variables as used in prior studies
(e.g. Chari and Chang, 2009; Contractor et al.,
2014; Lahiri, Elango and Kundu, 2014; Malhotra,
Lin and Farrell, 2016).
Following Kedia and Bilgili (2015) and Malho-
tra, Sivakumar and Zhu (2011), we control for the
target firm status by creating a dummy variable
Private Target, coded as 1 if the target firm is a
private entity, and 0 otherwise. Since private firms
are generally smaller than public firms, it is easier
for acquiring firms to finance the full acquisition
of private firms than public firms (Malhotra, Lin
and Farrell, 2016; Malhotra, Sivakumar and Zhu,
2011). We control for Industry Relatedness, which
is coded as 1 if the two firms have the same three-
digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise (Contractor et al.,
2014). The variable captures the ‘(dis-)similarity in
the knowledge-base, business practices, routines,
norms, and general competitive environment that
exists between the target firm’s industry and the ac-
quirer’s industry’ (Ahammad et al., 2018). Previ-
ous studies observe that full ownership is preferred
when two firms are from the same industry (Con-
tractor et al., 2014; Ellis et al., 2018; Lahiri, Elango
and Kundu, 2014).
In addition, we take into account the effect of
payment method on the ownership choice, because
prior studies have documented that cash-based ac-
quisitions tend to amplify information asymmetry
and thus the acquiring firm is likely to invest less
resources in the target firm’s acquisition (Malho-
tra and Gaur, 2014). In line with Lim, Makhija
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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and Shenkar (2016) and Malhotra, Lin and Far-
rell (2016), the payment method (Cash Payment) is
a binary variable, coded as 1 if more than 50% of
the deal value is paid with cash, and 0 otherwise.
As for the firm-level control variables, we in-
clude Acquirer Size, as previous works have shown
that larger acquirers have greater resources avail-
able for full acquisitions than smaller firms (Chari
and Chang, 2009; Kogut and Singh, 1988). We
measure the acquirer size as the logarithm of to-
tal assets. We also control for Acquirer Profitabil-
ity, because higher profitability increases the man-
ager’s confidence to undertake riskier projects and
therefore choose the complete acquisition even
when it does not seem the best entry mode choice
(Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). In accordance
with Bertrand, Betschinger and Settles (2016) and
Lim, Makhija and Shenkar (2016), we measure
Acquirer Profitability with the return on assets
(ROA), which is used as a control variable. We also
control forAcquirer Leverage, because it can be ar-
gued that a firm’s debt level influences its financial
flexibility (Peillex and Ureche-Rangau, 2016) and
therefore inhibits its ability to mobilize resources
to engage in full acquisitions.WemeasureAcquirer
Leveragewith debt-to-equity ratio, which is used as
a control variable. Finally, we control for Acquirer
Experience as we expect that firms with greater
experience in the target country may better man-
age the risks related to internationalization, and
in turn develop a preference for a full acquisition
(Gaur and Lu, 2007; Kogut and Singh, 1988). Ac-
quirer Experience takes the value 1 if the acquiring
firm has a prior cross-border acquisition in the tar-
get country, and 0 otherwise (Malhotra, Lin and
Farrell, 2016).
Regarding country-specific control variables,
we include eight variables: Cultural Distance, In-
stitutional Distance, Expropriation, Colony, Com-
mon Language, Geographic Distance, Developed
Country, GDP Growth Target and Crisis Target.
Previous studies have documented that a greater
Cultural Distance increases uncertainty and thus
affects the firm’s entry mode choice (Chari and
Chang, 2009; Malhotra and Gaur, 2014). In line
with Lahiri, Elango and Kundu (2014), Malhotra
and Gaur (2014) and Malhotra, Sivakumar and
Zhu (2011), Cultural Distance is estimated using
Hofstede’s (1980) data on four cultural dimen-
sions. These four dimensions are power distance,
individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoid-
ance. To aggregate these dimensions, we apply the








where Hi,t is the score for country i on the cultural
dimension t, and Hj,t is the score for country j on
the cultural dimension t. Vt is the variance of the
index score of cultural dimension t.
Moreover, we control for Institutional Distance,
which measures the difference in governance qual-
ity between host and home country, increasing
uncertainty and thus exerting a significant effect
on ownership choice (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Mal-
hotra and Gaur, 2014). It is based on the scores
of the World Bank’s six Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009), includ-
ing control of corruption, government effective-
ness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of
law and voice/accountability. These indicators are
commonly mobilized to capture institutional dis-
tance (Contractor et al., 2014;Malhotra andGaur,
2014; Malhotra, Lin and Farrell, 2016). In accor-
dance with Kogut and Singh (1988), the institu-








where Gi,t is the governance score t for country i
and Gi,t is the governance score t for country j. Vt
is the variance of the index score of governance
indicator t.
Beyond the institutional distance, a foreign
firm’s ownership choice may be affected by host-
country institutional environment. In particular,
foreign firms are concerned about being expropri-
ated when they are acquiring firms in host coun-
tries with poor institutional environment. Thus,
our analysis includes the variable Expropriation,
which is extracted from the Index of Economic
Freedom provided by the Heritage Foundation
(Duanmu, 2014).
Furthermore, since prior studies found that
colonial ties, as ameasure of informal institutional
distance, affect the ownership decision (e.g. Ellis
et al., 2018), we control for the colonial link be-
tween the acquiring and the target country. In ac-
cordance with Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008),
Colony is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the ac-
quiring and the target country had a colonial link,
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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and 0 otherwise. Common Language is also a bi-
nary variable that equals 1 if the acquiring and
the target country share a common official lan-
guage, and 0 otherwise (Buckley et al., 2017). Us-
ing the same language reduces the communication
barrier for international capital flows and increases
the propensity to opt for a full acquisition as entry
mode. In line with Malhotra, Sivakumar and Zhu
(2011) and Ellis et al. (2018), Geographic Distance
is measured by the logarithm of geographic dis-
tance between capitals of the target and acquirer
nations (in kilometres). Since greater Geographic
Distance amplifies the cost of transportation and
information during and after cross-border acqui-
sitions, acquirers may prefer partial acquisitions
when countries are geographically distant (Mal-
hotra, Sivakumar and Zhu, 2011). We consider
the learning intention of acquiring firms in cross-
border acquisitions by including Developed Coun-
try, which equals 1 if the target firm is from an
OECDmember country, and 0 otherwise (Buckley
et al., 2007; Gubbi et al., 2010). As foreign firms’
ownership choice may be influenced by the eco-
nomic growth potentials in host countries, we con-
trol for theGDPgrowth rate of the host country by
including GDP Growth Target. In order to further
take into account the host-country specific risk, we
also include a dummy variable Crisis Target, fol-
lowing Chung et al. (2013), that takes the value 1
when the target country experienced four consecu-
tive quarterly declines in GDP before the deal, and
0 otherwise.
Results
Regarding the correlation matrix (see Table 3),
most of the bivariate correlations are moderate. It
shows that Economic Relations, Political Relations
andMilitary Relations are negatively related to the
full ownership choice (−0.16,−0.21 and−0.08, re-
spectively). To check whether multicollinearity is a
concern, we calculated the variance inflation fac-
tors (VIFs). On average, the VIF is 1.80, which
is far below the recommended tolerance level
of 10.
Since the dependent variable is a dummy vari-
able, we use logistic regressions (see Table 4). In
all estimations, we included acquirer country, in-
dustry and year dummies to control for unob-
served effects derived from sample heterogeneity
and time-varying conditions. We observe consis-
tent effects of the control variables across all the
models. Based on the results of Model 1, De-
veloped Country and Acquirer Profitability signifi-
cantly increase the propensity for EMFs to opt for
full ownership. The significant effect of Developed
Country (β = 0.76, p < 0.01) shows the strategic
asset-seeking behaviour of EMFs in cross-border
acquisitions by opting for full acquisition.Acquirer
Profitability is significant and positive (β = 0.01,
p< 0.01), as profitable firms tend to have sufficient
financial resources to afford full acquisitions.
In contrast, Institutional Distance, Expropria-
tion,Cash Financed andAcquirer Size significantly
increase the propensity for EMFs to opt for partial
ownership. Since partial acquisitions offer greater
flexibility to EMFs, the significant effects of Insti-
tutional Distance (β = −1.35, p < 0.05) and Ex-
propriation (β = −0.02, p < 0.01) can be explained
by their desire to reduce the risk derived from un-
certain institutional environment. Cash Financed
shows a significant and negative sign (β = −0.53,
p< 0.01), because it is not easy for firms to finance
full acquisitions with cash. Finally, Acquirer Size
is negatively associated with the dependent vari-
able (β = −0.39, p < 0.01), as large firms tend to
diversify their business by exploiting target firms
through partial ownership.
Main analyses
As shown in Table 4, Model 2 estimates the effect
of Economic Relations on Ownership Choice. As
expected, there is a negative relationship between
Economic Relations and Ownership Choice (β
= −6.23, p < 0.01). Model 3 reveals the effect
of Political Relations on Ownership Choice. It
shows that Political Relations has a negative and
significant effect on the propensity for EMFs to
opt for full ownership (β = −0.55, p < 0.05).
Model 4 shows the effect of Military Relations on
Ownership Choice. The corresponding coefficient
is also negative and statically significant (β =
−15.55, p < 0.05), which indicates that EMFs opt
for full ownership to overcome the weak Military
Relations between their home country and host
country. In Model 5, we include all our main inde-
pendent variables to explain the ownership choice.
The results are qualitatively consistent with the
estimates of previous models. Indeed, Model 5
shows negative and significant effects of Economic
Relations (β = −6.34, p< 0.01),Political Relations
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Effects of economic, political and military relations on ownership choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Economic Relations −6.23*** −6.34***
(0.01) (0.00)
Political Relations −0.55** −0.52**
(0.01) (0.01)
Military Relations −15.55** −14.32*
(0.04) (0.06)
Cultural Distance 0.02 0.30 −0.06 0.19 0.21
(0.95) (0.36) (0.85) (0.56) (0.54)
Institutional Distance −1.35** −1.80*** −1.19** −1.44** −1.67***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Expropriation −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.01* −0.02** −0.02**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04)
Colony −0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20
(0.72) (0.98) (0.96) (0.99) (0.50)
Common Language −0.06 0.16 −0.18 −0.12 0.09
(0.77) (0.38) (0.38) (0.55) (0.65)
Geographic Distance 0.18 −0.21 0.02 0.11 −0.28**
(0.16) (0.10) (0.84) (0.39) (0.03)
Developed Country 0.76*** 0.65*** 0.55** 0.74*** 0.43*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
GDP Growth Target 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.08)
Crisis Target 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.43
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
Private Target −0.11 −0.07 −0.09 0.04 −0.06
(0.46) (0.63) (0.50) (0.49) (0.71)
Industry Relatedness −0.24 −0.22 −0.25* −0.25* −0.21
(0.1) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
Cash Financed −0.53*** −0.54*** −0.56*** −0.56*** −0.56***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquirer Size −0.39*** −0.30*** −0.27*** −0.28*** −0.28***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquirer Profitability 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquirer Leverage −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.36) (0.34) (0.31) (0.29) (0.39)
Acquisition Experience 0.01 −0.11 −0.07 −0.10 −0.10
(0.94) (0.48) (0.66) (0.54) (0.51)
Constant 2.82** 5.21*** 3.37** 2.36 5.89***
(0.06) (0.00) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00)
Observations 997 997 997 997 997
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Note: This table presents the results of logit models predicting full versus partial ownership. In all estimations, we included acquirer




(β = −0.52, p < 0.05) andMilitary Relations (β =
−14.32, p < 0.1) on EMFs’ propensity to opt for
full ownership entry mode.
In sum, these results suggest that when EMFs
acquire target firms originating from countries
with weak economic relationship with their home
country, they opt for full ownership supporting
the view of internalization theory, which supports
H1b.
Robustness checks
In order to ensure the robustness of our findings,
we performed several additional analyses by using
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 5. Sensitivity checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Economic Relations −6.00*** −5.61** −6.62*** −3.81*** −0.74*** −4.86**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Relations −0.45*** −0.53*** −0.47*** −0.31*** −0.06** −0.54**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Military Relations −16.18** −16.25** −13.74* −8.91* −0.79 12.39
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.57) (0.55)
Cultural Distance 0.09 −0.06 0.18 0.11 0.08* 0.99**
(0.79) (0.90) (0.59) (0.58) (0.08) (0.02)
Institutional Distance −1.92*** −1.92*** −1.70*** −1.08*** −0.14 −0.92**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.21)
Expropriation −0.02** −0.02** −0.02** −0.01*** −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.31) (0.39)
Colony 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.10
(0.50) (0.56) (0.49) (0.50) (0.74) (0.76)
Common Language 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 −0.02 −0.21
(0.79) (0.74) (0.65) (0.75) (0.49) (0.39)
Geographic Distance −0.25* −0.23 −0.26** −0.18** −0.04* −0.24
(0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.13)
Developed Country 0.42* 0.43* 0.40* 0.27* −0.02 −0.16
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.95) (0.52)
GDP Growth Target 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04* 0.01* 0.04*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Crisis Target 0.41 0.42 0.47* 0.26 0.05 0.26
(0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.13) (0.20) (0.39)
Private Target −0.06 −0.07 −0.08 −0.05 −0.03 −0.10
(0.67) (0.64) (0.58) (0.61) (0.14) (0.56)
Industry Relatedness −0.21 −0.22 −0.21 −0.13 −0.01 0.03
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.85) (0.87)
Cash Financed −0.54*** −0.54*** −0.53*** −0.34*** −0.05** −0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.20)
Acquirer Size −0.29*** −0.29*** −0.27*** −0.17*** −0.04*** −0.33***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquirer Profitability 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Acquirer Leverage −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.45) (0.42) (0.31) (0.38) (0.26) (0.43)
Acquisition Experience −0.05 −0.05 −0.08 −0.04 −0.02 0.27
(0.77) (0.74) (0.58) (0.68) (0.45) (0.14)
Constant 6.06*** 6.06** 5.62*** 3.69*** 1.41*** 5.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 997 997 997 997 997 997
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11




alternative measures and changing some specifica-
tions, as shown in Table 5. First, in the previous
analysis, Political Relations was calculated consid-
ering three voting options, namely, approval for
an issue, disapproval for an issue or abstain. We
include an alternative measure of Political Rela-
tions in Model 1 that only considers the two vot-
ing options: approval for an issue and disapproval
for it. Second, we include an alternative measure
of Cultural Distance in Model 2 that also consid-
ers two additional Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
(i.e. long-term orientation vs. short-term orienta-
tion and indulgence vs. restraint).
In addition, we used alternative empirical spec-
ifications by (a) running logistic regressions af-
ter excluding acquirer country, industry and year
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Friends or Foes? 15
dummies as shown in Model 3; and (b) using pro-
bit regressions as shown inModel 4. Moreover, in-
stead of employing a dummy variable as our de-
pendent variable (1 if the acquisition is full and 0 if
the acquisition is partial), we used a censored con-
tinuous variable to measure the ownership choice
of EMFs inModel 5. Since this variable is the per-
centage of ownership by the acquiring company
after the transaction, which ranges from 0.1% to
100%, we use a Tobit model.
Finally, we have coded our dependent variable
using the 50% threshold to estimate the results as
presented inModel 6 of Table 5. The variable takes
the value 1 if the firms acquired more than 50% of
the target company (full acquisition) and 0 if the
firm acquired less than 50% of the target company
(partial acquisition). The results obtained from
these additional analyses remain qualitatively sim-
ilar to our main finding, thereby supporting H1b.
Discussion and conclusion
Theoretical contributions and managerial
implications
By theorizing and testing the effect of bilateral
relationships on EMFs’ ownership choice, our
study first contributes to prior research on multi-
national corporations’ cross-border acquisitions.
Specifically, by developing conflicting hypotheses
grounded in real options theory and internaliza-
tion theory, it advances our understanding of how
affinity (or animosity) between countries – re-
flected in their bilateral relationships – shapes in-
ternational business transactions between firms.
Given the political risks derived from weak bi-
lateral relationships, internalization theory would
emphasize the potential for learning opportunities
(Stahl and Tung, 2015), while real options theory
would highlight the potential for misunderstand-
ing (Beugelsdijk, Ambos and Nell, 2018; Nell,
Kappen and Laamanen, 2017). In line with the in-
ternalization predictions, our analysis shows that
when bilateral relationships between home and
host countries are weak, entailing higher trans-
action and coordination costs, EMFs opt for full
ownership. Despite the costs and complexities of
operating in unfavourable host-country environ-
ments, derived from their weak bilateral institu-
tional relationships, we show that EMFs prefer full
acquisitions to achieve more efficient learning via
greater internalized control.
Second, and more broadly, our study intends
to make a connection between international busi-
ness and international relations literature. It is
well known that bilateral relationships between
home country and host country play an influential
role in gaining or losing a competitive edge for
multinational corporations (Hymer, 1960). This
is because the nature of multinational corpora-
tions as entities operating under multiple national
jurisdictions pinpoints the relevance of interstate
political relations to international business (Li
and Vashchilko, 2010). Yet, prior international
business research, drawing on institutional per-
spective and political risk, has provided little
insight into the institutional impact associated
with the broader international relations by con-
sidering bilateral or dyadic networks (Demirbag,
McGuinness and Altay, 2010). Drawing on an
international relations perspective to explain the
ownership choice implications of economic, polit-
ical and military relationships in a comprehensive
manner, our analysis not only shifts the country-
dyadic lens of existing country-level determinants
from distance to contact/friction (Li et al., 2019;
Shenkar, Luo and Yeheskel, 2008), but also from
differences to discordance (Lee, Shenkar and Li,
2008; Miller and Parkhe, 2002).
Third, our study advances understanding of
EMFs’ internationalization behaviour by high-
lighting the underlying factors that cause owner-
ship variances among EMFs. Although recent re-
search has recognized EMFs’ strong heterogeneity,
the explanatory power of existing theories to ex-
plain EMFs’ ownership choice remained ambigu-
ous. Specifically, we endeavoured to apply both
real options theory and internalization theory to
explain the ownership implications of bilateral re-
lationships in the context of EMFs. Apart from
the results of our main hypotheses, our analy-
sis further shows that EMFs prefer full acquisi-
tions when they enter developed countries (Hen-
nart, 2009). Such risk-taking behaviours by EMFs
are often intended to overcome their latecomer dis-
advantages, which are characterized by the acqui-
sition of critical assets from target firms to com-
pensate for weaknesses (Luo and Tung, 2007). The
findings – along with our main results – enable
us to disentangle the ambivalence in ownership
choice research and answer a growing body of re-
search calling for examining the predictive power
of existing theories across different contexts (Peng,
2003).
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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The current study also provides managerial im-
plications. It is known that one effective way to
deal with risks is to opt for partial ownership in
order to benefit from the existing legitimacy of the
local firm (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). This conven-
tional wisdom is based on the evidence from tra-
ditional multinational corporations (mainly from
the developed world). According to our findings,
EMFs choose full ownership even when there are
weak bilateral relationships. This is because EMFs
usually originate from countries where the pres-
ence of institutional voids and political hazards
is evident. As their political capabilities developed
over time can handle such constraints in their
home (emerging) countries, they are inoculated
against the potential disadvantages that are driven
by weak institutional relationships when they in-
ternationalize (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009;
Luo and Tung, 2007). Notably, one of the key fea-
tures of EMFs’ internationalization is their toler-
ance for host-country institutional risk (Buckley
et al., 2018). Therefore, instead of viewing the in-
stitutional environment as an exogenous element,
MNEs need to proactively and systematically ex-
ploit and internalize institutional advantages by
carefully incorporating political actors into their
governance structure and strategic planning (Doh,
Lawton and Rajwani, 2012; Mellahi et al., 2016).
Opportunities for future work
This study is not without limitations. Ownership
strategies as an entry mode cover a wider range of
possibilities (e.g. foreign subsidiaries, international
joint venture, etc.) than just cross-border acquisi-
tions, so we must be cautious in extrapolating the
findings to other contexts (Sun, Hu and Hillman,
2016). Despite the contextual limitation, our study
focused on the ownership choice in the context of
cross-border acquisitions, as cross-border acqui-
sitions have particular relevance for EMFs (Luo
and Tung, 2007, p. 485). This is mainly because
the strategic assets required by EMFs are not
available as free-standing assets on the open mar-
ket, other than through international acquisitions.
Future studies can test the predictive power of
real options and internalization theories in other
international business contexts by considering the
ownership decisions related to foreign subsidiaries
and international joint ventures. Moreover, our
analysis excludes state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
following Luo and Tung’s (2007, p. 482) approach
on operationalizing EMFs. However, it would be
interesting to extend our study to empirically ex-
amine the role of bilateral relationships in SOEs’
ownership decisions.
Finally, it is important to note that our the-
ory development is based on three premises on
EMFs. First, EMFs often intend to overcome their
latecomer disadvantages through learning charac-
terized by the acquisition of critical capabilities
from target firms in order to compensate for weak-
nesses (Luo and Tung, 2007). Second, EMFs are
less vulnerable to institutional challenges and gov-
ernment interference, as their country of origin
includes institutional voids and political hazards
that give them strong political capabilities (Guil-
lén and García-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007).
Third, EMFs are in need of greater legitimacy in
host countries to cope with the risks derived from
weak bilateral relationships. Given the elements
embedded in our research, the generalizability of
our findings might be limited due to our sample
comprising EMFs, which are known to have spe-
cial forms of internationalization strategy (Buck-
ley et al., 2018; Luo and Tung, 2007). Nonetheless,
our research provides a context for advancing the
understanding of the predictive power of existing
theories (Peng, 2003).
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